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Introduction
Thirty-seven seconds. Due to a federal statutory damages cap, that is the time it took
Wal-Mart to make enough money to pay a recent damage award to a former disabled employee
for intentional, egregious discrimination.1 Patrick Brady, who has cerebral palsy, applied for a
sales associate job at Wal- Mart in the summer of 2002.2 During the application process, WalMart made several inquiries prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 and
specifically prohibited by a previous consent decree it entered into with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).4 It hired Brady nevertheless, but over the course of the next
few months, subjected him to adverse work conditions based on his disability including transfer
from the pharmacy department to pushing carts and a hostile work environment.5
Brady brought suit against Wal-Mart and the store manager, alleging violations of the
ADA and the New York Human Rights Law.6 Brady also claimed intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligence in Wal-Mart’s hiring, supervising, and retaining employees.7
At trial, a jury awarded $9,114 in back pay, $2.5 million for emotional pain and suffering, and
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nominal damages of $1 each for the reasonable accommodation and improper application
inquiries claims.8 It also awarded a total of $5 million in punitive damages.9
Because the ADA incorporates the remedies provided under the Civil Rights Act of
1991,10 Magistrate Judge Orenstein was required under 42 USCS 1981a(b)(3)(D) to reduce the
award to comply with a damages cap.11 Under that statute, in actions for intentional
discrimination in employment, the total of both compensatory and punitive damage awards may
not exceed certain limits based on the number of people employed by the offending employer.12
Therefore, an employer like Wal-Mart, with more than 500 employees, would only have to pay a
maximum of $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.13 In his opinion, Judge Orenstein
states that his ruling “respects the law, but it does not achieve a just result.”14
To be sure, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a victory for advocates of civil rights and
fair employment practices. It succeeded enormously in bringing the remedies afforded to women
and the disabled more in line with victims of other types of discrimination. However, several
potential problems with the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remain. One of these
problems is equal protection regarding the absence of caps on damages for discrimination based
on race and national origin.15 In addition, plaintiffs may argue, on equal protection grounds, that
they should not get less of a damage award for the same reprehensible conduct just because their
employer has fewer employees.16 Conversely, defendants with many employees may argue they
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should not have to pay more for the same conduct just because they employ more people.17
These potential problems, however, are outside the scope of this comment and thus will not be
addressed.
In this comment, I will seek to answer the question of how to achieve a “just result”
under 1981a without losing sight of the congressional intent to protect small businesses from
exorbitant damages. Part I outlines the history and purpose of punitive damages as deterrence,
punishment, and societal retribution. Next, Part II examines the background, enactment, purpose,
and legislative intent of 1981a, while Part III focuses on the ineffectiveness of 1981a in
achieving the goals of punitive damages. Finally, Part IV proposes solutions to make the act
more effective while preventing “windfall” awards and protecting small businesses. Statutory
caps based on number of employees is not necessarily poor legislation; however, the law must be
revised to improve its effectiveness while still preserving its purpose.

I. Background of Punitive Damages: History and Purpose
Punitive damages, like most aspects of American jurisprudence, have their roots in
English law. The awarding of punitive damages dates back to the 1760s when English courts
recognized their purpose as exemplary.18 Early American cases show that the legal system
recognized that civil damage awards not only compensated the victim but also provided a
disincentive to other potential wrongdoers.19 In the first case to award punitive damages in the
United States, the court said this remedy should be applied to punish and deter intentional torts
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that were "of the most atrocious and dishonorable nature."20 As the American court system
developed, the purpose of punitive damages as deterrence, vindication, and punishment became
well-established in the United States.21
Generally, a jury may award punitive damages if the defendant’s conduct was
particularly malicious, willful, reckless, or oppressive.22 When awarding or reviewing punitive
damages, courts consider a variety of factors, including the reprehensibility of the offense,
proportionality of the punitive damages to the compensatory damages,23 the extent of the harm,
and the intent and wealth of the defendant.24 The last factor, the wealth of the defendant, has
received criticism from the Supreme Court25 but remains a valid consideration in most
jurisdictions.26
In recent decades, a host of observers have directed much attention to punitive
damages.27 While many politicians and the press decry the awarding of punitives as unfair,
arbitrary, and out of control,28 other commentators dispute this view.29 Proponents of tort reform
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point to “runaway juries” as the major problem and advocate statutory caps as the solution.30
What they often overlook, however, is that judges award approximately the same levels of
punitive damages as juries, and courts often reduce the headline-grabbing awards by juries.31 In
addition, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases addressing proportionality and propriety, has
already “reformed” the way courts award punitive damages.32
Although substantial controversy regarding the role of punitive damages continues,33
scholars and judges alike agree that they are a necessary part of the legal system.34 Because
criminal penalties are not available for many civil wrongs, or because the criminal remedies
available are inadequate,35 punitive damages provide for punishment of the offender.36 When
compensatory damages are nominal, punitive damages provide a deterrent to the prohibited
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conduct by both the defendant and by other potential wrongdoers.37 In addition, punitive
damages serve the societal goal of retribution to other victims who are not before the court.38

A. Punishment and Deterrence
Punitive damages serve the unique purpose of punishing the defendant and deterring
future misconduct by the defendant and others similarly situated.39 Especially for wealthy
defendants, relatively insubstantial compensatory damages do not begin to measure the enormity
of the defendant's wrongful behavior and have no deterrent effect.40 For that reason, punitive
damages should be a substantial and essential ingredient in all civil rights litigation.
Many legal experts generally regard the goals of punishment and deterrence as
inextricably intertwined.41 Most scholars agree that punishment achieves some level of
deterrence by rendering the defendant’s conduct unprofitable.42 One commentator states that
plaintiffs utilize the remedy as "an orderly legal retaliation...to be preferred to a private
vengeance, which will disturb the peace of the community... ."43 In a way, then, punitive
damages serve as a sort of civil “law enforcement.” Another commentator explains: “Deterrence
may be viewed as operating ex ante, in preventing prospective wrongdoers from violating the
rules, whereas law enforcement may be seen as operating ex post, in catching and punishing
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wrongdoers who are not deterred.”44 Therefore, a rational offender will recognize the potential
ramifications of his actions and seek to avoid his contemplated behavior, which in turn increases
compliance with the law.45
Despite the general view that the goal of American civil law is not to punish but to
compensate,46 civil courts assess punitive damages with the same goals as those of the criminal
justice system.47 Like criminal fines, punitive damages purport to deter harmful behavior.48 As
the lines between civil and criminal penalties blurred in recent years,49 the Supreme Court
remarked that punitive damages "further the aims of the criminal law: 'to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence."'50

B. Societal Compensation and Retribution Goal
Not only do punitive damages punish the defendant and provide a deterrent to potential
future offenses, they also accomplish the societal goal of redressing the harms caused by that
defendant to other silent victims.51 As Elizabeth Cabraser argues: “Punitive damages are not an
entitlement of the victims, but of society: a punitive damages award is a civil punishment visited
upon defendants to vindicate the public interest in deterrence, and to penalize conduct that
44

See Owen, supra note 22, at 380.
Id.
46
See Galanter & Luban, supra note 27, at 1404.
47
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against
Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 267-68; see also Galanter & Luban, supra note 27, at 140407.
48
Indeed, one court even suggested that where punitive damages prove to provide ineffective deterrence, criminal
sanctions might be a logical next step. Rosario Necarez v. Torres Gaztambide, 633 F. Supp. 287, 298 n.15 (D.P.R.
1986), rev’d on other grounds 820 F.2d 525 (1st Circ. 1987).
49
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
50
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)(quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988)(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
51
See Sharkey, supra note 38. But see State Farm, at 423. “Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise
of the reprehensibility analysis.” Id.
45

violates the social contract and injures society."52 Although class action suits most properly
achieve this goal,53 procedural rules often preclude this course of action where the relief sought
is monetary.54 As a result, many victims who perceive their own pecuniary damages as
inconsequential never redress their injuries. Therefore, although not ideal,55 society can at least
begin to recoup its collective losses through substantial punitive damage awards.
Punitive damages are particularly effective and necessary, on a societal level, where the
tortfeasor is likely to escape liability.56 If the offender has a good chance of escaping liability, the
deterrent effect of punitive damages is decreased.57 These situations most commonly occur when
the victim either does not realize the extent or the source of his injuries, has been shamed by the
act, is not sophisticated or financially able to bring a lawsuit, or surmises that the compensatory
damages are too low.58
Employment discrimination cases fit these situations of underdeterrence to a tee. Victims
often blame themselves for their injury.59 They may feel shameful or embarrassed,60 especially if
the discrimination points to the victim’s disability as a socially-perceived weakness,61 or when
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the victim experiences so much degradation that he or she loses self-confidence.62 Victims of
discrimination are more likely to be undereducated63 or poor.64 These victims are less likely to
bring discrimination suits against their employers, and the employers will escape liability. This
leakage prevents compensatory damages awarded to individual plaintiffs from compensating for
the social costs of anti-social behavior.
Additionally, other obstacles face victims of employment discrimination in the court
system.65 Although discrimination complaints are relatively easy to file with the EEOC,66 the
lawsuits are increasingly hard to win.67 While the success rates in judge-tried insurance and
personal injury cases were 43.6% and 41.8%, respectively, plaintiffs in employment cases
succeeded in only 18.7% of cases.68 Even if successful, courts overturn employment cases at a
higher rate than other categories.69 One commentator has a theory for this dismal success rate:
bias by the courts.70
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Discrimination victims also face a lack of attorneys willing to take on a statisticallydoomed case.71 Plaintiffs may file a complaint with their state agency, if one exists, or with the
EEOC.72 Unfortunately, the EEOC is under-funded and has such a backlog of cases that the
average time before a case is even considered ready to litigate is over 600 days.73 That leaves
private attorneys as the only effective option. However, even with the attorney’s fees provisions
of the Civil Rights Act,74 most cases present too great a risk for the few employment
discrimination attorneys who remain because attorney’s fees are available only when the plaintiff
prevails.75 Undoubtedly, some attorneys are not motivated solely by profit.76 However, these
attorneys not only run the risk of obtaining a settlement with no provision for attorney’s fees,77
but the capital required to litigate a discrimination case when the collection of fees could be over
five years away also puts many public interest and small law firms out of the market.78
Despite the best intentions of members of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to “encourage victims to pursue their claims, create an incentive for attorneys to take such
cases, and provide a greater economic threat to employers,"79 the unfortunate reality is that
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employers still dominate.80 Therefore, it is important, as a society, to increase the deterrent value
in order to decrease the number of future victims. This also fulfills the societal goal of ensuring
that “citizens who engage in such contemptible behavior against other citizens receive society’s
full rebuke and condemnation”81 and “promotes confidence in the legal system by reassuring
victims and others that justice has been done.”82

II. Background of 1981a: Purpose and Legislative History
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which included Title VII prohibiting
discrimination in employment)83 and the ADA in 1990,84 the equal rights of women and the
disabled have been an important feature of our legal system.85 However, prior to the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs in Title VII and ADA actions could only seek equitable
relief and were not entitled to a jury trial, rendering these laws “toothless tigers.”86 Although
victims of discrimination based on race or national origin could seek a variety of damages based
on section 1981 (which prohibits racial discrimination), including compensatory damages and
punitive damages in addition to equitable relief,87 the limited remedies available to victims of sex
and disability discrimination were inadequate.88 Before 1981a was enacted, these victims could
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only hope to receive injunctive relief89 and attorney’s fees.90 These limited remedies did not
provide enough incentive to encourage mistreated employees to stand up for their rights and to
seek a legal remedy.91
Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, the Supreme Court began dismantling the protections
against discrimination offered by Title VII.92 Several decisions during the Supreme Court term of
1988-89 restructured the future path of federal civil rights enforcement, particularly in the area of
employment discrimination.93 These decisions weakened both a plaintiff’s ability to prevail in an
employment discrimination action and the remedies available to a successful plaintiff.94
The first of a series of four cases to come out of this term and prompt legislative action
was Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.95 This case held that section 1981 does not cover posthiring racial discrimination. The Court’s decision in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.
dropped another bombshell. 96 In that case, the Court held that the statute of limitations had run,
preventing plaintiffs from challenging a seniority system governing layoffs implemented to
intentionally discriminate against female employees because they waited until the layoffs
actually occurred instead of suing when the policy was implemented.97 In Martin v. Wilks, the
Court provided for almost unlimited challenges to consent decrees formed to resolve
employment discrimination disputes, thereby threatening existing decrees with constant
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challenge and diminishing their value in resolving future Title VII disputes.98 The fourth case
decided in June of 1989 that further diminished the rights of victims of employment
discrimination was Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.99 In that case, the Court held that
employers do not have the burden of proving a business necessity to justify practices that have a
disparate impact on protected classes.100
Critics decried these Supreme Court decisions as a retreat from the great strides made in
the last century in protecting the rights of underprivileged minorities.101 Civil rights
organizations and some members of Congress maintained that legislation was needed to restore
correct interpretations of the law102 and also to reconcile the differences in remedies available for
different kinds of discrimination.103 The George H.W. Bush Administration and the business
lobby, however, contended that restorative “legislation isn’t necessary.”104 Nevertheless, this did
not deter activists and progressive politicians from pursuing a remedy and developing legislation
to overturn these unpopular decisions.105 The inequity in remedies available to victims of
different types of discrimination,106 as well as these Supreme Court cases, provided the
motivation Congress needed to reform the remedies available under Title VII and the ADA.107
In 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. One major change in the 1991 Act was
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages to victims of intentional disability and sex
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discrimination.108 Punitive damages were available for victims of discrimination who could
prove that the employer “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of the aggrieved individual.”109 Congress’s intent
for the inclusion of punitive damages was to “punish employers for their unlawful conduct, to
reinforce public policy against discrimination, and to deter future discrimination.”110 Opponents
of the Act argued that including compensatory and punitive damages would invite frivolous
lawsuits and huge damage awards.111 Therefore, the Act included a cap on damages as a
compromise between Congress and the Bush Administration-backed business lobby.112 The
compromise calibrated the cap in four tiers, with the applicable tier dependant on the number of
employees the offending employer employed during the previous year.113 Employers with 15100 employees have damages capped at $50,000, while employers with 101-200 employees have
a damage cap of $100,000; 201-500 employees means a cap of $200,000, and for employers with
501 or more employees, the cap is $300,000.114 The damages cap applies to the aggregate sum of
compensatory and punitive damages.115
By placing caps on the total of compensatory and punitive damages, Congress clipped the
teeth of the Act and tied the hands of judges seeking to further justice. Section 1981a forces
judges to reduce jury awards despite the demands of justice116 and a historical tradition of
deference to a jury’s verdict.117 Although punitive damage awards are generally reviewable,118
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judges are not, in cases without damage caps, required to reduce the jury’s award.119 The
traditional respect of the jury120 and the historical reluctance to alter a jury’s verdict makes
modern judges hesitant to reduce a jury’s award.121 However, with Section 1981a’s cap on
damages, this deference to the jury’s verdict is eliminated. One court noted that $300,000 was
[I]nsufficient to compensate plaintiff for the psychological damage, pain, and humiliation
she has suffered, in addition to the loss of a lucrative career and secure retirement. The
Court is bound by the statutory cap set forth in § 1981a however, and cannot award
plaintiff compensatory damages in excess of that cap.122
The damage caps limit the ability of judges to achieve a “just result.”

III. Why 1981a is Ineffective
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to help combat the persistence of
employment discrimination123 by adding compensatory and punitive damages to effectuate a
greater level of deterrence.124 Although the Act succeeded in re-establishing some rights that the
Supreme Court had rolled back in its decisions of the 1988-89 term and brought the remedies
available under Title VII in line with other anti-discrimination statutes, the compromises made to
guarantee passage of the bill weakened the best intentions of legislators. Judging from the level
of recidivism, the Act, with its caps on damages, has not achieved its goal of eliminating the
118
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persistent problem of employment discrimination. In particular, the caps on punitive damages
prevent courts from assuring a just result in all cases. The caps also diminish the deterrent effect
and the societal compensation for egregious conduct by large employers.
One important reason why damage caps undermine the deterrent effect of punitive
damages is that they allow potential defendants to include the maximum damage award into their
cost of doing business.125 Predictability of the cost of damages enables a company to do a costbenefit assessment to decide whether instituting company-wide anti-discrimination training or
similar preventive measures is profitable.126 In addition, companies can factor in the low
probability of getting “caught” for discrimination.127 Therefore, while a small company may take
affirmative steps in the training of its management and employees to prevent discrimination, a
large company with thousands or millions of employees might very well decide it is more
profitable to instead absorb the cost of a capped damage award for its discriminatory practices.
Damages then become merely a fee, allowing defendants to “continue their misconduct for a
price.”128
A good example of this lack of deterrence is the repeat offenses committed by the
corporate giant Wal-Mart. Although Wal-Mart is surely not the only, or even worst, offender of
anti-discrimination laws, its large size129 and repeated discrimination violations make it an
appropriate illustration of the drawbacks of the damage caps of section 1981a. The damages that
Wal-Mart has to pay do not have a deterrent effect, as evidenced by its continued violation of
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anti-discrimination statutes.130 In ten years, the EEOC alone has filed sixteen lawsuits against
Wal-Mart for violation of the ADA.131
In one particularly reprehensible case, Wal-Mart refused to hire two deaf men on the
basis of their disability.132 The men filed suit through the EEOC and subsequently entered into a
consent decree with Wal-Mart.133 The consent decree detailed the actions the court required WalMart to take, including paying back pay, compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, and
providing full-time jobs for the two men, complete with interpreters for meetings and training.134
Wal-Mart also agreed to implement an extensive training program on the ADA135 and to
complete these measures within 18 months.136
Unfortunately, at the expiration of the consent decree, Wal-Mart had failed to comply.137
It did not provide timely reports of its compliance; it did not provide interpreters; and it failed to
train its staff.138 The district court found Wal-Mart in contempt and ordered it to comply with the
decree, to pay a $750,200 sanction to the Arizona Center for Disability Law, and to run a local
television commercial stating it had violated the ADA and referring people who believe they
have been discriminated against on the basis of disability to contact the EEOC.139
Despite these sanctions, Wal-Mart has not stopped its discriminatory practices. The
EEOC filed another ADA suit against Wal-Mart for refusing to provide reasonable
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accommodation to Plaintiff Alice Rehberg.140 Ms. Rehberg is limited in the amount of time she
can stand, yet Wal-Mart refused to let her occasionally sit during her shift as a “greeter.”141 WalMart constructively discharged Ms. Rehberg from her position, and the EEOC filed suit.142
Wal-Mart subjected another employee to a hostile work environment and eventually
terminated him because of his disability.143 Plaintiff Phillips sustained a traumatic brain injury in
a near-fatal auto accident144 and, after surviving a four-month coma, he started the long journey
to rehabilitation.145 As a result of his brain injury, his speech is slow, and he has trouble
concentrating, experiences dizziness and headaches, and has difficulty with his fine motor
skills.146 Fourteen years after the accident, after re-learning how to eat, talk, walk and take care
of himself, Phillips obtained employment at Sears with the help of the Alabama Department of
Rehabilitation Services (ADRS).147 Sears eliminated his position in 1993, but ADRS helped him
to gain employment at Wal-Mart.148
During his work in the night receiving department, his supervisor berated him for being
slow and unproductive.149 His supervisor and co-workers made fun of him and mocked his slow
speech over the store intercom.150 The store manager even yelled at him for making a
suggestion.151 Although the store’s management never reprimanded Phillips for having a bad
attitude, he was nonetheless fired for his poor attitude and performance.152
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Wal-Mart has refused to hire a man with an amputated arm, a pregnant woman, a
wheelchair user, and a man with cerebral palsy.153 It is clear that Wal-Mart perceives that it is
immune from punishment.154 When the maximum possible penalty that Wal-Mart might have to
pay is capped at $300,000, Wal-Mart can be assured that punishment for its actions will not cut
into its profits.
Recently, the “commercial titan”155 produced a memorandum outlining how the company
could save money by reducing healthcare costs.156 This memorandum exemplifies the flippant
philosophy of Wal-Mart regarding workers with disabilities.157 In the memo, Executive Vice
President of Risk Management and Benefits Susan Chambers158 recommends attracting a
“healthier workforce” by requiring physical activity in all job categories, “e.g. all cashiers do
some cart gathering.”159 One lawyer has referred to the memorandum as “a cesspool of legal
violations,” and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing calls it “very
alarming.”160 Chambers’ blatant recommendation that Wal-Mart introduce these changes to
“dissuade unhealthy people from coming to work at Wal-Mart” shows a complete disregard for
ADA regulations. Furthermore, it proves that the multiple lawsuits brought against the company
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have not had the desired deterrent effect to prevent this systematic discrimination by “the world’s
largest retailer.”161

IV. Proposed Reforms
The previous examples of Wal-Mart’s repeated violations of anti-discrimination statutes
illustrate that the current caps on punitive damages do not have the desired deterrent effect. The
following proposed solutions would increase deterrence while expressly conforming to the
legislative intent of providing a ceiling on damages to protect small businesses. These proposed
reforms are: 1) Keep the current caps based on “number of employees,” but recalibrate the tiers
to account for very large employers; 2) Eliminate the “number of employees” calculations and
instead base caps on the net worth of the offending employer; and 3) Increase the punitive
damages caps in cases of repeat violations of similar anti-discrimination statutes.

A. Reform the Current “Number of Employees” Scheme
One potentially effective solution is to retain the current “number of employees” scheme
but continue increasing the caps to make the damages for employers with thousands or even
millions of employees more proportional to the overall size of the business. The basis of section
1981a’s remedial scheme has a solid foundation: make the caps proportionate to the size of the
business in order to protect relatively small businesses from financial ruin, in addition to
deterring frivolous lawsuits.162 However, the caps stop at 500 employees, subjecting thousands
of businesses to the same cap despite wide differences in number of employees. For example,
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Air Transport, Inc., a company with 555 employees nationwide,163 has to bear the same burden
as Wal-Mart, which has 1.2 million employees in the United States.164
If the law recalibrated cap levels to take into account massive employers such as WalMart, the matrix would look something like this:165

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
From
15
101
201
501
1,001
2,001
4,001
8,001
16,001
32,001
64,001
128,001
256,001
512,001
1,024,001
2,048,001
4,096,001
8,192,001
16,384,001
32,768,001

To
100
200
500
1,000
2,000
4,000
8,000
16,000
32,000
64,000
128,000
256,000
512,000
1,024,000
2,048,000
4,096,000
8,192,000
16,384,000
32,768,000
65,536,000

CAP
$50,000.00
$100,000.00
$200,000.00
$300,000.00
$600,000.00
$1,200,000.00
$2,400,000.00
$4,800,000.00
$9,600,000.00
$19,200,000.00
$38,400,000.00
$76,800,000.00
$153,600,000.00
$307,200,000.00
$614,400,000.00
$1,228,800,000.00
$2,457,600,000.00
$4,915,200,000.00
$9,830,400,000.00
$19,660,800,000.00

This matrix would place Wal-Mart in the tier with a $614,400,000 cap and keep Air Transport,
Inc.’s cap at $300,000.
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A related cap formula based on the existing “number of employees” system would assess
a cap of $500 per employee. Such a formula avoids lumping a very small company of fifteen
employees with a business that is over six times as large. Using this formula, the cap for a
business with fifteen employees would be $7,500, while a business with 100 employees would
be subject to a $50,000 cap. Likewise, Air Transport, Inc., would have a cap of $277,500 while
Wal-Mart’s would be $600 million. This formula results in an assessment of damages that is
directly proportionate to the size of the employer and furthers the legislative intent of protecting
small businesses from financial ruin. 166

B. Base the Caps on Net Worth
American jurisprudence generally accepts that punitive damages, absent statutory
guidance, may be based on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s act, the extent of the harm
actual caused or intended to cause, or the wealth of the defendant.167 Indeed, some states now
require a jury to consider the defendant’s wealth in assessing punitive damages.168 The rationale,
of course, is that it takes a higher dollar amount to punish a rich person than a poor one.169 A
typical ratio of punitive damages to defendant’s net worth is about one percent.170
One early American case authorized the use of wealth in determining the size of punitive
damages to send an “impressive lesson” to rich, oppressive companies that exploited their
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power.171 The Goddard court wrote: "There is one but vulnerable point about these ideal
existences, called corporations; and that is, the pocket of the monied power that is concealed
behind them; and if that is reached they will wince."172 The court reasoned that "when it is
thoroughly understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and indifferent agents, or
reckless and insolent servants, better [employees] will take their places, and not before."173
Another way to frame the inadequacy of an award is to figure the amount of time it took
the offending business to earn the amount awarded,174 as Judge Orenstein did in Brady v. WalMart.175 Some courts have held one week is an accepted amount of time on which to base an
award.176
As previously discussed, Air Transport, Inc., with 555 employees, is subject to the same
damages cap as Wal-Mart, with 1.7 million employees. The net worth of these two companies is
as dissimilar as their respective number of employees. In 2004, Air Transport, Inc. had a net
worth of $15.4 million.177 Wal-Mart, on the other hand, had a net worth of $13.6 BILLION.178
The ratio for a punitive damages award of $300,000 to Wal-Mart’s net worth is .02%. By
comparison, $300,000 is 1.9% of Air Transport, Inc.’s net worth. Additionally, Wal-Mart earns
$300,000 in significantly less than one week. In fact, according to Brady v. Wal-Mart,it took
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Wal-Mart only 37 seconds to earn $300,000.179 Wal-Mart’s figures do not come close to the
generally accepted amount of time or percentage of net worth.
If the caps under 1981a were based on the accepted one percent, Wal-Mart’s cap would
be $136 million. By comparison, Air Transport, Inc. would be subject to a cap of $154,000.
These amounts, of course, are just the caps on allowable awards. A jury may award any amount
it deems appropriate,180 but the judge would still have to reduce the award to accommodate the
cap. The caps are a ceiling to preserve the viability of the defendants’ businesses.
Because the intent of Congress was to protect small businesses, the most effective way to
achieve that goal would be to base the caps on the net worth of the employer. Caps calculated in
this way would be fairer to all parties because “the limits would be related to ability to pay, not
to an arbitrary personnel count” and would adequately punish large, wealthy businesses. 181

C. Increase the Caps with Each Subsequent Violation
Wal-Mart’s repeated violation of civil rights laws shows that the current statutory caps do
not deter its conduct. If the maximum amount of punitive damages increased with each recidivist
act, increasingly large awards would eventually deter it. The Supreme Court recognized that “a
recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender” because “repeated misconduct is
more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."182 The “existence and
frequency”183 of Wal-Mart’s prior violations of discrimination laws would make them subject to
greater penalties with every transgression.
179
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The Supreme Court has expressed concerns with application of stiffer penalties for
recidivist defendants in the civil context.184 In State Farm, the Court discussed that the
consideration of prior, extraterritorial misconduct "creates the possibility of multiple punitive
damage awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the
judgment another plaintiff obtains."185 This problem could be avoided, however, by mandating
that jury instructions require consideration be given to prior punitive awards for the same course
of conduct and that appellate courts factor such prior awards into excessiveness review.186
Increased penalties for subsequent violations raise the stakes each time a defendant
engages in similar bad behavior.187 Harsher penalties for repeated criminal conduct is a common
and traditional concept in criminal law.188 Every jurisdiction today has some punishment scheme
that takes prior criminal acts into consideration during sentencing.189 Although the effectiveness
of sentencing guidelines that take this approach, such as California’s “three strikes” law, have
had mixed reviews,190 in cases of employment discrimination, increased penalties would force
businesses to reevaluate their policies and training programs and take proactive measures to
prevent future violations.

D. Tempering “Windfall” Recoveries with Split-Recovery Statutes
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One major concern with these solutions to the current cap scheme is that plaintiffs may
receive “windfall” damage awards.191 This could be easily remedied, however, by the addition of
a split-recovery scheme.192 Under a split-recovery statute, a pre-determined portion of punitive
damage awards are earmarked to go to a specific public service fund or to the treasury as another
form of revenue.193 Nine states currently have split-recovery statutes for punitive damages
arising out of state tort actions: Alaska, Georgia, Utah, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, Indiana,
Illinois,194 and California.195 The designated destination of the state’s portion varies from a lowincome legal services fund in Missouri to the general state treasury in Alaska, Georgia, and
Utah.196 The percentage allocated to the state treasury or special fund varies from fifty to
seventy-five percent.197
Although there are currently no federal split-recovery laws, the Supreme Court has
already expressed acceptance of the idea.198 In actions for employment discrimination, the split-
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recovery statute could authorize the distribution of part of the punitive damage award to the
EEOC or charitable organizations that work toward the elimination of discrimination.199 In
addition to resolving concerns with “windfall” awards, this solution would increase the societal
goal of retribution200 by donating money to organizations that work to alleviate the societal
problem of discrimination.

Conclusion
The current statutory caps on punitive damages in intentional employment discrimination
do not allow for effective enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. As evidenced by Wal-Mart’s
recidivism, the caps do not promote deterrence, nor do they reflect society’s revulsion for
discriminatory acts. Particularly in the context of employment discrimination, where victims may
be reluctant to or incapable of seeking retribution, effective deterrence in the form of significant
punitive damages is crucial to achieving a just employment arena. Possible means to achieve
meaningful punitive damage awards while still protecting small employers from financial ruin
include recalibrating the caps to increase penalties for large corporations, base the caps on net
worth, or increasing damage caps for repeat violations. In each instance, enacting a splitrecovery statute can circumvent windfall awards, thereby deterring frivolous lawsuits while
funneling resources into under-funded charities or government agencies whose goal is to help
victims of discrimination. Caps based on number of employees is not necessarily bad policy;
however, the law must be reformed in order to render the caps effective while still preserving
their purpose.
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